The DOJ's Civil Rights Division secured a $68 million settlement against Colony Ridge Land LLC and its affiliates for predatory land sales and lending practices targeting immigrant communities near Houston, Texas. Colony Ridge must also halt all new residential sales for three years and adopt ability-to-repay underwriting standards. The company denied wrongdoing and stated it is "only paying out the settlement to end the case."1 2 3
The dollar amount is significant. It is one of the largest fair lending settlements against a non-bank entity in recent years. But the enforcement mechanism is what alternative business lenders need to understand: this case was brought by the DOJ's Civil Rights Division under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), not by the CFPB or a banking regulator. Any entity that extends credit, including non-bank lenders, is subject to this enforcement authority regardless of whether they hold a banking charter or financial services license.
What Colony Ridge Actually Did
Colony Ridge developed residential communities in Liberty County, Texas, and financed lot purchases through seller-financed contracts targeting predominantly Hispanic buyers. The DOJ alleged that Colony Ridge used high-pressure sales tactics, required only nominal down payments, and extended credit without assessing borrowers' ability to repay. The company did not verify gross income; borrowers self-reported income figures that were never checked against documentation.1 4
The result was predictable: from September 2019 through September 2022, Colony Ridge initiated foreclosures on at least 30% of seller-financed lots within just three years of the purchase date. Roughly one in four Colony Ridge loans ended in foreclosure, after which the company repurchased the properties and sold them to new borrowers, creating a revolving door of debt and dispossession that the DOJ characterized as a "cycle of foreclosures and financial hardship."1 4
The community itself suffered from inadequate infrastructure. The settlement requires $18 million for drainage and flooding improvements, $30 million for general infrastructure development, and $20 million for increased law enforcement presence, which gives some indication of the conditions Colony Ridge left behind.1 2
The original lawsuit was filed jointly by the CFPB and DOJ in December 2023. By the time of settlement in February 2026, the CFPB's role had diminished significantly. The CFPB has been effectively gutted under the current administration, with approximately 1,400 workers receiving layoff notices and the agency securing only $145 million in emergency funding through March 2026. The DOJ's Civil Rights Division carried this case to resolution independently.5
The Enforcement Vector That Should Concern You
Most alternative business lenders think about regulatory risk through the lens of banking regulators: CFPB, OCC, state financial regulators, FinCEN. The Colony Ridge case demonstrates a different enforcement pathway that is harder to anticipate and harder to defend against.
ECOA's definition of "creditor" is broad. It covers anyone who "regularly participates in the decision of whether or not to extend credit." This includes non-bank lenders, MCA funders who make underwriting decisions, factoring companies that approve accounts, and equipment finance providers that evaluate lessees. The distinction between "loan" and "purchase of future receivables" that MCA companies rely on for usury law exemptions does not insulate them from ECOA.
The DOJ's Civil Rights Division operates independently from banking regulators. It does not need a referral from the CFPB or a state AG to open an investigation. It has its own attorneys, its own investigative resources, and its own enforcement priorities. When the CFPB is defanged, the DOJ does not scale back. It redirects, as Colony Ridge demonstrates.
The $68 million settlement from a land developer, not a bank, sends a clear message about the scale of potential damages. For context, the FTC's action against Seek Capital resulted in a lifetime ban from business financing. The DOJ's action against Colony Ridge resulted in $68 million in payments plus a three-year business halt. These are not warning letters. These are existential enforcement outcomes.
For more on how federal enforcement actions are targeting non-bank lenders specifically, see: Seek Capital Banned from Business Financing by FTC.
The "No Income Verification" Problem
The Colony Ridge allegations will sound familiar to anyone in alternative business lending. The core claim: the company extended credit without verifying whether borrowers could repay. It relied on self-reported income, did not cross-reference documentation, and structured deals that were profitable for the lender regardless of whether the borrower succeeded.
In MCA and revenue-based financing, the equivalent practice is funding based solely on bank statement revenue without documenting the merchant's overall financial picture: existing obligations, other advances, seasonal patterns, or structural profitability. Bank statements show deposits. They do not show whether the merchant can service your advance alongside three others.
The settlement requires Colony Ridge to "adopt underwriting standards that assess borrowers' ability to repay through consideration of borrowers' income, assets, and debt."1 This is not a novel regulatory concept. It is a restatement of basic underwriting discipline that the company neglected because the churn model (foreclose, repurchase, resell) was profitable enough without it.
The parallel to MCA renewal cycles is direct. A funder who renews a struggling merchant rather than booking the loss is engaging in the same economic logic Colony Ridge used: extract value from the cycle of distress, not from the borrower's success. The DOJ did not consider this acceptable for Colony Ridge. There is no reason to assume it would consider it acceptable for MCA.
Demographic Concentration as Legal Exposure
The ECOA and FHA claims centered on Colony Ridge's targeting of Hispanic borrowers. The marketing was concentrated in Spanish-language media, the sales staff communicated primarily in Spanish, and the community was overwhelmingly Latino. The DOJ argued this constituted discriminatory lending, not because the product was inherently discriminatory, but because the predatory terms were disproportionately directed at a specific demographic.
For alternative lenders, the lesson is about portfolio concentration and marketing patterns. If your borrower base skews heavily toward a specific ethnicity, geography, or income bracket, and your marketing is concentrated in demographic-specific channels, you need documented business rationale for why that concentration exists. "That's where our leads come from" is not a legal defense. "Our product serves underbanked businesses in specific industries that correlate with these demographics, and here is our documented underwriting process" is a start.
Audit your marketing channels. If 80% of your funded deals come from one lead source that targets a specific demographic, the pattern is visible. Document why, document your underwriting standards, and ensure those standards are applied consistently regardless of the borrower's demographics.
The Tricolor case showed where this trajectory ends. Tricolor targeted Hispanic communities with subprime auto loans, pledged the same 29,000 loans to multiple warehouse lenders simultaneously, and operated for years without detection. The result: Chapter 7 liquidation in September 2025, criminal indictments for CEO Daniel Chu and three executives with a mandatory 10-year minimum sentence in December 2025, and over $340 million in disclosed bank losses at JPMorgan and Fifth Third alone. The pattern of demographic targeting combined with weak verification does not end with a consent order. It ends with liquidation and prison.
See: Tricolor 29,000 Loans Pledged Twice.
Building the Compliance Record Before the Investigation
The Colony Ridge settlement requires the company to implement underwriting standards it should have had from day one: income verification, ability-to-repay assessment, and documentation of the credit decision. The company is now required to build this infrastructure under court supervision. The lenders who build it voluntarily, before an enforcement action, control the timeline and the cost.
For alternative business lenders, the compliance record starts with entity verification. Confirming that the business entity is real, active, and operating within its authorized scope is the foundational step that the Colony Ridge investigation revealed was missing. Colony Ridge did not verify borrower income. It also did not verify whether the entities purchasing land were legitimate operations or speculative vehicles.
Entity verification from primary source state records is the foundational first step. When the DOJ asks what you did to verify borrowers before extending credit, the answer needs to be specific, auditable, and sourced from primary state databases.
Three Actions for Monday Morning
- Audit your demographic concentration. Pull your funded deals from the past 12 months and map them by borrower demographics, geography, and lead source. If the concentration is skewed, document the business rationale. If you cannot articulate the rationale, you have a vulnerability the DOJ can exploit under ECOA's disparate impact theory.
- Document your ability-to-repay process. Even if your product is not technically a "loan," documenting that you assessed the borrower's capacity to service the advance protects against the exact claims that cost Colony Ridge $68 million. Bank statement analysis is a start, but add entity verification, existing obligation checks, and a documented credit decision process.
- Budget for compliance infrastructure. A mid-size shop processing 200 funded deals per month should expect to spend 1 to 3 percent of revenue on compliance infrastructure: entity verification, documentation systems, portfolio monitoring, and legal review. At $68 million for a land developer, even the high end of that range pays for itself many times over. The DOJ has demonstrated it will pursue non-bank credit extenders with the same vigor it applies to regulated institutions.












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